|
|
|
题名
|
作者
|
年代
|
出处
|
被引量
|
| 1 | Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | The Quarterly Journal of Ec-onomics1997，112，3： | 1 |
| 2 | Large Shareholders,Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，4： | 1 |
| 3 | Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the Firm显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，： | 1 |
| 4 | Large shareholders,monitoring,and the value of the firm显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，3： | 1 |
| 5 | Large Share- holders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 显示文摘 | BURKART M GROMB D PANUNZI F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，3： | 1 |
| 6 | Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，3： | 1 |
| 7 | Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs 显示文摘 | Gromb D Vayanos D | 2002 | Journal of Financial Economics2002，66，23： | 1 |
| 8 | Equilibrium and Wealth in Markets with Financially Constrained Arbitrageurs显示文摘 | Gromb D Vayanos D | | 0，，： | 1 |
| 9 | Large sharehold- ers, monitoring, and the value of the firm显示文摘 | BURKART M GROMB D PANUNZI F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，，112： | 1 |
| 10 | Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，： | 1 |
| 11 | Large shareholders,monitoring,and the value of the firm显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | The Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，，： | 1 |
| 12 | Large Shareholders Monitoring and the value of the Firm 显示文摘 | Burket M Gromb D Pannunzi F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，，112： | 1 |
| 13 | Why higher takeover premia protect mi nority shareholders显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1998 | Journal of Political Economy1998，106，1： | 1 |
| 14 | On the strength of corporate cultures显示文摘 | Carrillo Juan D Gromb Denis | 1999 | European Economic Review Volume:43 Issue:4-6 April1999，，： | 1 |
| 15 | Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | The Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，3： | 1 |
| 16 | Large Shareholders Monitoring and the Value of the Firm 显示文摘 | Burkhart M D Gromb F Panunazi | 1997 | Journal of Financial Economics1997，112，3： | 1 |
| 17 | Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1998 | Journal of Political Economy1998，，106： | 1 |
| 18 | Large shareholders, monitoring and the value of the firm显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 1997 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1997，112，3： | 1 |
| 19 | Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfer of corporate control显示文摘 | Burkart M Gromb D Panunzi F | 2000 | Journal of Finance2000，，55： | 1 |
| 20 | Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control显示文摘 | Burkart M D Gromb F Panunzi | 2000 | Journal of Finance2000，55，2： | 1 |
您所在的机构暂未开通此部分的功能，请联系管理员