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| 1 | A muhi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalist sand entrepreneurs 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，，4： | 1 |
| 2 | Contracting, Signaling, and Moral Hazard: A model of Entrepreneurs, Angels, and Venture Capitalists 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 3 | Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard prob- lem显示文摘 | ELITZUR R GAVIOUS A WNSLEY A K P | 2012 | Omega2012，40，3： | 1 |
| 4 | Contracting, signaling, and mo- ral hazard: A model of entrepreneurs, 'angels', and venture capitalists显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Joumal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 5 | Contracting, singnaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, angels, and venture capitalists 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 6 | Executive incentive compensation and earnings manipulation in a multi - period setting 显示文摘 | Elitzur R R Yaari V | 1995 | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization1995，，2： | 1 |
| 7 | Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard, a model of entrepreneurs, 'angel', and venture capitalists显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gaviou A | 2003 | Journal of Bussiness Venturing2003，18，： | 1 |
| 8 | A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，，4： | 1 |
| 9 | A multi-period game theo retic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs显示文摘 | ELITZUR R GAVIOUS A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，，4： | 1 |
| 10 | Executive incentive compensation and earning manipulation in a multi - period setting 显示文摘 | R Ramy Elitzur Varda Yaari | 1995 | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization1995，，26： | 1 |
| 11 | Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A Wensley A K P | 2011 | Omega2011，40，3： | 1 |
| 12 | Contrcting, Signaling,and Moral Hazard: Amodel of Entrepreneurs, Angels, and Venture Capitalists 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 13 | A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，144，2： | 1 |
| 14 | Executive incentive compensation and earning manipulation in a multiperiod setting显示文摘 | Elitzur R R Yaari V | 1995 | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization1995，26，2： | 1 |
| 15 | Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard, a model of entrepreneurs, 'Angels', and venture capitalists显示文摘 | Elitzur R | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 16 | A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，144，2： | 1 |
| 17 | Contracting,signaling,and moral hazard:a model of entrepreneurs,angels,and venture capitalists显示文摘 | ELITZUR R GAVIOUS A | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，： | 1 |
| 18 | A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs 显示文摘 | ELITZUR R GAVIOUS A | 2003 | European Journal of Oper- ational Research2003，144，2： | 1 |
| 19 | Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition显示文摘 | Elitzur R J Mintz | 1996 | Journal of Public Economics1996，60，： | 1 |
| 20 | Game theory as a tool for understanding information services outsourcing 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Wensley A | 1997 | Journal of Information Technology1997，12，1： | 1 |
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