|
|
|
题名
|
作者
|
年代
|
出处
|
被引量
|
| 1 | A secure and highly efficient first-order masking scheme for AES linear operations显示文摘Due to its provable security and remarkable device-independence,masking has been widely accepted as a noteworthy algorithmic-level countermeasure against side-channel attacks.However,relatively high cost of masking severely limits its applicability.Considering the high tackling complexity of non-linear operations,most masked AES implementations focus on the security and cost reduction of masked S-boxes.In this paper,we focus on linear operations,which seems to be underestimated,on the contrary.Specifically,we discover some security flaws and redundant processes in popular first-order masked AES linear operations,and pinpoint the underlying root causes.Then we propose a provably secure and highly efficient masking scheme for AES linear operations.In order to show its practical implications,we replace the linear operations of state-of-the-art first-order AES masking schemes with our proposal,while keeping their original non-linear operations unchanged.We implement four newly combined masking schemes on an Intel Core i7-4790 CPU,and the results show they are roughly 20%faster than those original ones.Then we select one masked implementation named RSMv2 due to its popularity,and investigate its security and efficiency on an AVR ATMega163 processor and four different FPGA devices.The results show that no exploitable first-order side-channel leakages are detected.Moreover,compared with original masked AES implementations,our combined approach is nearly 25%faster on the AVR processor,and at least 70%more efficient on four FPGA devices. | Jingdian Ming Yongbin Zhou Huizhong Li Qian Zhang | 2021 | Cybersecurity2021，4，1： | 0 |
| 2 | Transparency order versus confusion coefficient:a case study of NIST lightweight cryptography S‑Boxes显示文摘Side-channel resistance is nowadays widely accepted as a crucial factor in deciding the security assurance level of cryptographic implementations.In most cases,non-linear components(e.g.S-Boxes)of cryptographic algorithms will be chosen as primary targets of side-channel attacks(SCAs).In order to measure side-channel resistance of S-Boxes,three theoretical metrics are proposed and they are reVisited transparency order(VTO),confusion coefficients variance(CCV),and minimum confusion coefficient(MCC),respectively.However,the practical effectiveness of these metrics remains still unclear.Taking the 4-bit and 8-bit S-Boxes used in NIST Lightweight Cryptography candidates as concrete examples,this paper takes a comprehensive study of the applicability of these metrics.First of all,we empirically investigate the relations among three metrics for targeted S-boxes,and find that CCV is almost linearly correlated with VTO,while MCC is inconsistent with the other two.Furthermore,in order to verify which metric is more effective in which scenarios,we perform simulated and practical experiments on nine 4-bit S-Boxes under the nonprofiled attacks and profiled attacks,respectively.The experiments show that for quantifying side-channel resistance of S-Boxes under non-profiled attacks,VTO and CCV are more reliable while MCC fails.We also obtain an interesting observation that none of these three metrics is suitable for measuring the resistance of S-Boxes against profiled SCAs.Finally,we try to verify whether these metrics can be applied to compare the resistance of S-Boxes with different sizes.Unfortunately,all of them are invalid in this scenario. | Huizhong Li Guang Yang Jingdian Ming Yongbin Zhou Chengbin Jin | 2021 | Cybersecurity2021，4，1： | 0 |
| 3 | Transparency order versus confusion coefficient:a case study of NIST lightweight cryptography S-Boxes显示文摘Side-channel resistance is nowadays widely accepted as a crucial factor in deciding the security assurance level of cryptographic implementations.In most cases,non-linear components(e.g.S-Boxes)of cryptographic algorithms will be chosen as primary targets of side-channel attacks(SCAs).In order to measure side-channel resistance of S-Boxes,three theoretical metrics are proposed and they are revisited transparency order(VTO),confusion coefficients variance(CCV),and minimum confusion coefficient(MCC),respectively.However,the practical effectiveness of these metrics remains still unclear.Taking the 4-bit and 8-bit S-Boxes used in NIST Lightweight Cryptography candidates as concrete examples,this paper takes a comprehensive study of the applicability of these metrics.First of all,we empirically investigate the relations among three metrics for targeted S-boxes,and find that CCV is almost linearly correlated with VTO,while MCC is inconsistent with the other two.Furthermore,in order to verify which metric is more effective in which scenarios,we perform simulated and practical experiments on nine 4-bit S-Boxes under the non-profiled attacks and profiled attacks,respectively.The experiments show that for quantifying side-channel resistance of S-Boxes under non-profiled attacks,VTO and CCV are more reliable while MCC fails.We also obtain an interesting observation that none of these three metrics is suitable for measuring the resistance of S-Boxes against profiled SCAs.Finally,we try to verify whether these metrics can be applied to compare the resistance of S-Boxes with different sizes.Unfortunately,all of them are invalid in this scenario. | Huizhong Li Guang Yang Jingdian Ming Yongbin Zhou Chengbin Jin | 2022 | Cybersecurity2022，5，1： | 0 |
您所在的机构暂未开通此部分的功能，请联系管理员