| 2 | Communication Scheduling and Remote Estimation With Adversarial Intervention显示文摘We study a communication scheduling and remote estimation problem within a worst-case scenario that involves a strategic adversary. Specially, a remote sensing system consisting of a sensor, an encoder and a decoder is configured to observe,transmit, and recover a discrete time stochastic process. At each time step, the sensor makes an observation on the state variable of the stochastic process. The sensor is constrained by the number of transmissions over the time horizon, and thus it needs to decide whether to transmit its observation or not after making each measurement. If the sensor decides to transmit,it sends the observation to the encoder, who then encodes and transmits the observation to the decoder. Otherwise, the sensor and the encoder maintain silence. The decoder is required to generate a real-time estimate on the state variable. The sensor,the encoder, and the decoder collaborate to minimize the sum of the communication cost for the sensor, the encoding cost for the encoder, and the estimation error for the decoder. There is also a jammer interfering with the communication between the encoder and the decoder, by injecting an additive channel noise to the communication channel. The jammer is charged for the jamming power and is rewarded for the estimation error generated by the decoder, and it aims to minimize its net cost. We consider a feedback Stackelberg game with the sensor, the encoder, and the decoder as the composite leader, and the jammer as the follower. Under some technical assumptions, we obtain a feedback Stackelberg solution, which is threshold based for the scheduler,and piecewise affine for the encoder and the decoder. We also generate numerical results to demonstrate the performance of the remote sensing system under the feedback Stackelberg solution. | Xiaobin Gao Emrah Akyol Tamer Basar | 2019 | IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica2019，6，1： | 1 |
| 6 | Robust Designs Through Risk Sensitivity:An Overview显示文摘This is an overview paper on the relationship between risk-averse designs based on exponential loss functions with or without an additional unknown(adversarial)term and some classes of stochastic games.In particular,the paper discusses the equivalences between risk-averse controller and filter designs and saddle-point solutions of some corresponding risk-neutral stochastic differential games with different information structures for the players.One of the by-products of these analyses is that risk-averse controllers and filters(or estimators)for control and signal-measurement models are robust,through stochastic dissipation inequalities,to unmodeled perturbations in controlled system dynamics as well as signal and the measurement processes.The paper also discusses equivalences between risk-sensitive stochastic zero-sum differential games and some corresponding risk-neutral three-player stochastic zero-sum differential games,as well as robustness issues in stochastic nonzero-sum differential games with finite and infinite populations of players,with the latter belonging to the domain of mean-field games. | BASAR Tamer | 2021 | Journal of Systems Science & Complexity2021，34，5： | 0 |
您所在的机构暂未开通此部分的功能，请联系管理员