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您的检索式：作者名="Zhaozhan Lin"
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| 1 | Pricing and Service Strategies for Two-sided Platforms显示文摘Nowadays,more and more transactions or interactions like online dating and shopping are completed on two-sided platforms involving two groups of agents.On these two-sided platforms,there often exist cross-network effects,i.e., the benefits that agents at one side receive are positively related to the number of agents at the other side,and vice versa.This paper considers such two-sided platforms,where the platforms offer a certain service to attract agents of both sides to join the platforms,and then charge agents who join the platforms a lump-sum fee to gain the profit.We present service and pricing strategies for both monopolistic and duopolistic platforms,respectively.We also investigate the impact of platforms'life cycle on their service and pricing strategies.Some managerial implications are shown. | Xiaogang Lin Chuanying Chen Zhaozhan Lin Yongwu Zhou | 2019 | Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering2019，28，3： | 2 |
| 2 | INVENTORY REPLENISHMENT POLICY FOR THE DECISION MAKER WITH PRESENT-BIASED PREFERENCE AND TIME-INCONSISTENCY UNDER INFLATION显示文摘由于围住的合理性,如果决定包含立即的报酬,人们经常为即时满足冲,但是如果决定包含立即的费用,拖延。当人们正在做内部时间的决定以后做贸易离开报酬和费用时,偏导礼品的偏爱和时间矛盾愿望是更突出的。人们超过礼品,他们为在未来的结果的偏爱将随着时间的过去衰退。在伪夸张的打折下面合并偏导礼品的偏爱和时间矛盾,完全与缺乏在通货膨胀和变化时间的需求下面预定钱的价值 backlogged,我们为一个败坏的项目开发一个库存补充模型。有益于决定制造者的库存补充政策如下。随时间矛盾的增加,一个人能增加订缺乏的数字和减少部分;随在上面的限制以内的危险率的增加,一个人能增加订缺乏的数字和减少部分;随加重的贴现率的增加,一个人能增加订缺乏的数字和部分。夸张打折增加订的数字并且减少夸张打折的最后的利润,和度加强如此的结果。作为结果,当做内部时间的决定时,为一个决定制造者的最佳的政策是保持尽可能合理。 | Yongwu Zhou Zhaozhan Lin | 2017 | Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering2017，26，5： | 1 |
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