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| 1 | Asymmetric first- price auctions: A perturbation approach显示文摘 | Fibich G Gavious A | 2003 | Mathematies of Operations Research2003，28，4： | 1 |
| 2 | Innovation in Pyramidal Ownership Structures显示文摘 | Gavious I Hirsh N Kaufman D | 2015 | Finance Research Letters2015，13，： | 1 |
| 3 | A muhi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalist sand entrepreneurs 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，，4： | 1 |
| 4 | Contracting, Signaling, and Moral Hazard: A model of Entrepreneurs, Angels, and Venture Capitalists 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 5 | Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard prob- lem显示文摘 | ELITZUR R GAVIOUS A WNSLEY A K P | 2012 | Omega2012，40，3： | 1 |
| 6 | Contracting, signaling, and mo- ral hazard: A model of entrepreneurs, 'angels', and venture capitalists显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Joumal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 7 | Contracting, singnaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, angels, and venture capitalists 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
| 8 | Explicit solutions of optimization models and differential games with nonsmooth (asymmetric) reference-price effect显示文摘 | Fibich G Gavious A Lowengrart O | 2003 | Operations Research2003，51，5： | 1 |
| 9 | Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard, a model of entrepreneurs, 'angel', and venture capitalists显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gaviou A | 2003 | Journal of Bussiness Venturing2003，18，： | 1 |
| 10 | A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，，4： | 1 |
| 11 | A multi-period game theo retic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs显示文摘 | ELITZUR R GAVIOUS A | 2003 | European Journal of Operational Research2003，，4： | 1 |
| 12 | All-pay auctions with risk-averse players显示文摘 | Fibich G Gavious A Sale A | 2006 | International Journal of Game Theory2006，34，4： | 1 |
| 13 | Bid costs and endogenous bidcaps显示文摘 | Gavious A B.Moldovanu A.Sela | | 0，，： | 1 |
| 14 | Optimal price promotion in the presence of asymmetric reference‐price effects显示文摘 | Fibich G Gavious A Lowengart O | 2007 | Managerial and Decision Economics2007，28，6： | 1 |
| 15 | Optimal knowledge outsourcing model显示文摘 | GAVIOUS A RABINOWITZ G | 2003 | Omega2003，31，6： | 1 |
| 16 | Incentives' effect in influenza vaccination policy 显示文摘 | Yamin D Gavious A | 2013 | Management Science2013，59，12： | 1 |
| 17 | Explicit solutions of optimization models and differential games with nonsmooth (asymmetric) reference-price effect 显示文摘 | Fibich G Gavious A Lowengrart O | 2003 | Operations Research2003，51，5： | 1 |
| 18 | Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, ‘angels,’ and venture capitalists显示文摘 | Ramy Elitzur Arieh Gavious | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，，6： | 1 |
| 19 | Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A Wensley A K P | 2011 | Omega2011，40，3： | 1 |
| 20 | Contrcting, Signaling,and Moral Hazard: Amodel of Entrepreneurs, Angels, and Venture Capitalists 显示文摘 | Elitzur R Gavious A | 2003 | Journal of Business Venturing2003，18，6： | 1 |
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